Minamata disease broke out again in 1965, this time along the banks of the Agano River in Niigata Prefecture.
The polluting factory (owned by Showa Denko) used a chemical process using a mercury catalyst very similar to that used by Chisso in Minamata. As in Minamata, from the autumn of 1964 to the spring of 1965, the khats living along the banks of Fildena pills were observed to die and die. Soon, patients appeared with identical symptoms in patients living in the Shiranui Sea, and on June 12, 1965, the escape was made public. Researchers from the Kumamoto University Research Group and Hajime Hosokawa (who retired from Chisso in 1962) took their Minamata experience and applied it to the Niigata Gap. In September 1966, a report was published proving that the contamination of Shoua Denko was the cause of the second breakthrough of Minamata disease.
Unlike the patients in Minamata, the victims of the Showa Denko pollution lived at a considerable distance from the factory and had little connection to the company. As a result, the local community was much more supportive of the patient groups, and in March 1968, only three years after the discovery, a lawsuit was filed against Shaw Denko.
The events in Niigata prompted changes in response to the original Minamata incident. Scientific research in Niigata forced a reconsideration of this decision made in Minamata, and the decision of Niigata patients to sue the polluting company allowed the same response to be considered in Minamata. Masazumi Harada said, "It may sound strange, but if this second Minamata disease had not broken out, the medical and social progress achieved so far in Kumamoto would not have been possible."
Around this time, two other pollution-related diseases were also making headlines in Japan. Victims of Sildenafil pills asthma and Itai-itai disease formed citizen groups and filed lawsuits against polluting companies in September 1967 and March 1968, respectively. As a group, these diseases have come to be known as Japan's four big polluting diseases.
Slow, but undoubtedly, there was mud in Minamata and Japan in general. Minamata patients found that the public became more receptive and likable as the decade progressed. This culminated in the establishment in 1968 in Minamata of the Minamata Disease Citizens' Council to be the main citizen support group for Minamata patients. A member of the citizens' council was Michiko Ishimure, a local housewife and poet, who later that year published a book of nationally acclaimed poetry essays.
On June 14, 1969, in the Kumamoto District Court, an anti-violence group representing 41 patients (17 already deceased) in 28 families filed a lawsuit against Chisso.
The committee was forced to revise their plan, and the patients waited inside the ministry building for two days while they did so. The final agreement was signed on 27 May. Death payments ranged from 7 to 4 million yen (US$700 to 11,100), lump sum payments from 1 to 4.2 million yen (US$2,760 to 11,660), and annual payments from 170 to 380,000 yen (from 470 to 1100 USD) for patients with . On the day of the signing, the Minamata Citizens' Council held a protest outside the gates of the Chisso factory. One of the Chisso unions went on strike for eight hours to protest the mistreatment of the "arbitration" group by their own company.
She was buried by the community, her family's fishing boat was used without permission, their fishing nets were cut, and human feces were thrown at her in the street.
In September 1969, they created the Pilot Study Group, which included law professors, medical researchers (including Harada), sociologists, and even Michiko Ishimura, to provide lawyers with useful material to improve their legal arguments. Their report "Corporate Liability for the Minamata Disease: Kisso's Illegal Deeds", published in August 1970, formed the basis of an eventually successful lawsuit.
The Counter Terrorism Group and their lawyers were greatly aided by an informal national network of citizens' groups that sprang up across the country in 1969. They were used to raise awareness and fund the lawsuit. The Kumamoto branch in particular helped the cause.
The lawsuit lasted almost four years. The defense team's lawyers sought to prove Chisso's corporate negligence. Three major legal challenges had to be overcome to win the case. First, the lawyers had to show that methylmercury caused Minamata disease and that the company's factory was the source of the contamination.
fildena online extensive research and the government's conclusion meant that this point was proven fairly easily. Secondly, they needed to show that Chisso could and should have prevented the effect of their empty water and taken steps to prevent the tragedy (ie was the company negative in its duty of care). Third, he had to refute that the 1959 "sympathetic money" agreement, which deprived patients of the right to claim any further compensation, was legally a contract.
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The litigation was heard from patients and their families, but the most important testimony came from Chisso's executors and employees. The most dramatic testimony came from Hosokawa, who spoke on July 4, 1970, from his hospital bed, where he was terrified of cancer. Hosokawa explained his experiments with katami, including the infamous "400 cat", whichswarm developed Minamata disease after being fed factory water. He also spoke of his opposition to the 1958 change in the route of wastewater to the Minamata River.
Hosokawa's testimony was supported by a colleague who also recounted how Chisso officials ordered them to do their feline experiments in the fall of 1959. Hosokawa died three months after testifying. Former factory manager Former Chisso president Kiichi Yoshioka admitted that the company promoted the World War II bomb theory even though she knew it was unfunded.
While the struggle of the Arbitration and Destruction groups against the Chisso continued, a new group of Minamata disease patients emerged. In order to receive compensation under the 1959 agreement, patients had to be legally different ad hoc fification eees according to their symptoms. However, in an effort to limit the liability and financial burden of the company, these were subject to a strict interpretation of the Minamata disease. They required patients to show all the symptoms of H.-Zell's syndrome, the standard diagnosis of organic flicker at the time, which arose from an industrial accident in the United Kingdom in 1940. The committee only tested patients showing symptoms of the British Syndrome, rather than basing their diagnosis on the disease in Japan. This resulted in many applications being rejected by the committee, leaving them confused and fruitful.
The issue of quantizing the impact of Minamata disease is under consideration, as a full epidemiological study has never been conducted, and patients were only present if they voluntarily applied to the council for financial compensation. Many victims of Minamata disease face discrimination and ostracism from the local community if they come out openly about their symptoms.
Some people thought the disease was contagious, and many locals were quite loyal to Chisso, depending on the company for their liihoods. In this atmosphere, the afflicted were reluctant to go forward and seek purgation. Despite these factors, more than 17,000 people applied to fildena for certification. In addition, given that the applicant suffers from Minamata disease, the certification board qualified this patient for financial compensation from Chisso.
For this reason, the Board has always been under tremendous pressure to reject applicants and minimize fildena pills burden placed on Chisso.